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Abstract
During the latter part of the 1990s the introduction of the euro, the dramatic increase in the
supply of venture capital in most EU countries, and the creation of several ‘new’ equity
markets targeted at innovative firms have dramatically transformed the financing prospects of
European entrepreneurial firms. In this study we contribute to a deeper understanding of their
actual relevance by  (i) gathering new evidence on European venture capital and on Europe’s
‘new’ stock markets, (ii) providing a rigorous econometric analysis of their impact on
corporate growth, and (iii) elaborating on our findings to devise a research agenda.
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1.  Introduction 
The success of entrepreneurial companies in the US since the 1980s created a wide gap between 
America and Europe in terms of their ability to compete in a knowledge-based economy 
(European Commission (2000)) and to commercialize high-tech products (European 
Commission (2001)). European policy-makers have been looking for appropriate policies to 
close such a gap. In particular, they have been looking for policies which could exploit the 
ability of innovative companies to create jobs (Schreyer (2000)). The 1998 Risk Capital 
Communication of the European Commission and the ensuing Action plan have provided the 
main policy framework, which rests on the idea that the most effective way to spur 
entrepreneurship is to reduce capital and labor market imperfections; it also stresses the need to 
create stock markets targeted at high-growth companies in a drive to spur the supply of risk 
capital for the financing of entrepreneurial firms which are subject to stricter credit constraints 
than established firms, especially in riskier, high-tech industries (Guiso (1998)).   
During the latter part of the 1990s some important changes have dramatically 
transformed the prospects of European entrepreneurial firms. First, the introduction of the euro 
and its consequences at both product and financial market level have substantially advanced the 
creation of a truly European economic area. Second, the supply of venture capital in most EU 
countries has dramatically increased, providing unprecedented access to risk capital financing 
for entrepreneurial companies. A third major change in the European context has been the 
creation of several ‘new’ equity markets targeted at innovative firms. Finally, policies towards 
the financing of entrepreneurial firms have known a renewed spurt. For example, several 
countries have introduced more favorable treatments of capital gains. Also, the conversion of the 
European Investment Fund into a major investor in venture capital funds has committed a large 
EU budget to nurturing well-managed venture capital firms.  
These changes are potentially very important. Studies based on US evidence, for 
example, have shown that venture-backed companies are more effective innovators (Hellmann 
and Puri (2000) and Kortum and Lerner (2000)). The lack of a well established venture capital 
industry has therefore been identified as a major cause for the want of European entrepreneurial 
companies with a strong innovative potential. Also, European stock markets have traditionally 
been unwelcoming of young companies without an established track record (Pagano, Panetta, 
and Zingales (1998), Rydqvist and Högholm (1995)). Venture capital and the ‘new’ markets are 
also likely to sustain each other, as stock markets provide venture capital with a viable exit 
option from their investments (Black and Gilson (1998)). In this paper we document in detail these 
developments and put them into perspective.    2
First, we look at facts. We gather new evidence on European venture capital and on 
Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets, the two sources of finance for innovative entrepreneurial 
companies which have most changed in the 1990s. We compare the recent evolution of venture 
capital in Europe and in the US, in terms of funds raised and invested and of companies 
financed. We find that venture capital in Europe has grown fast, but that it is far from reducing 
the gap with US venture capital. We then look at which companies have listed on Europe’s 
‘new’ markets. We find them to raise large sums of equity and invest it in tangible capital and in 
hiring new employees. On average, these companies grow fast, but the high variation of 
accounting performance measures across companies indicates that these markets list some very 
successful ones along with some which are at best disappointing. While the ‘new’ markets have 
provided an important source of finance until 2000, since then the number of listings has 
dwindled, coming to a virtual halt in 2002.  
Second, we delve deeper into the evidence and ask what do these changes really mean 
for the financing of European entrepreneurial firms. We argue that only micro-level data can 
provide a proper assessment of the effectiveness of venture capital in nurturing innovative start-
ups. Our results cast some doubts on the common perception that venture-backed companies are 
better able to create new jobs, an important assumption of several policy documents. This leaves 
us wonder what role does venture capital play in Europe. We suggest that this may be the 
provision of funds. Venture-backed companies, in fact, raise larger sums at IPO. But we suggest 
that the support of venture capital may be especially important at early stages of entrepreneurial 
companies’ lives. In other words, while they do not grow much faster than other companies, 
venture-backed companies may be very profitable ventures which would have never come into 
being without venture financing. Finally, we ask whether the opening of the ‘new’ stock markets 
has made it easier for entrepreneurial firms to finance their growth. We find positive evidence. 
Our results stress the importance of rigorous disclosure standards for stock markets to select 
companies with truly high growth potential.  
Third, we elaborate on our findings to devise a research agenda. We argue that we need 
to better understand the subtle interplay between different institutional constraints whose 
interaction has only recently been explored by theorists. For example, a better grasp of the 
indirect effect of intellectual property rights on entrepreneurs’ willingness to start a venture, or 
the effects of taxation on the quality of venture capital mentoring services may help explain how 
European venture capital works. It could also provide some testable hypothesis for the purported 
lack of entrepreneurial initiatives in Europe. A better understanding of the magnitude of these 
effects could provide useful material for well informed policy decisions. We suggest further   3
research might point towards a greater role of venture capital in overcoming credit constraints. 
Finally, we argue that we need to better understand how Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets can 
attract companies with a real high-growth potential. Once the financial cycle will allow listings 
once again, regulators and stock exchanges will need to have upgraded admission and listing 
rules to ensure that these markets continue to exist and offer entrepreneurial companies a 
valuable financing opportunity.  
2.  Facts 
For European entrepreneurial companies, the 1990s have seen unprecedented changes in the 
availability of financing sources. Since 1995, the new wave of venture investing  focussed more 
on early stages than the traditional expansion-oriented funds.  At about the same time Europe 
experienced another important change, namely the gradual opening of several stock markets 
which aimed at emulating NASDAQ in providing a listing outlet for innovative, high-growth 
companies. In this Section we document such developments. 
2.1  The coming of age of European venture capital 
In Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002a) we show how venture capital fundraising and investment 
behaved during the 1990s. Here we focus on the later developments, and in particular on the 
sudden slow-down in investing after the 2000 stock markets collapse. Table 1 shows the 
evolution of venture fundraising and investments from 1995 to 2001 in US and Europe. 
Fundraising had increased at a similar pace in the two economies until 2000, when it was about 
ten times as large as in 1995. Interestingly, Europe seems to have behaved more conservatively 
at the end of the decade: while it increased fundraising less than in the US in 2000 (69% 
compared to 79%), the fall in 2001 was also smaller (28% compared to 57%). These trends are 
confirmed by preliminary estimates for 2002. In absolute terms the US remains the largest 
industry for funds raised and capital under management, but the distance has somewhat 
narrowed with the current slowdown. 
As regards the composition of financing sources Table 2 suggests that the difference in the 
composition of financing sources, while still substantial, has somewhat narrowed. In particular, 
institutional investors now play a definitely larger role in Europe, while still remains almost half 
as important as in the US, where financial institutions, most importantly banks, have become 
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Table 1.  Venture capital funds raised in Europe and the US 













1995     5,682     9,930  3,952     7,371 
1996  10,044   12,420  4,652   11,903 
1997  22,456   17,600  5,388   16,063 
1998  23,366   30,740  7,636   21,460 
1999  27,037   58,810 12,623   54,437 
2000 45,540 104,880   19,516 105,910 
2001  34,216   40,270 11,985   40,619 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculation\ns on EVCA and NVCA data. Data are in millions of current dollars. 
Another fact which stands out is the relative resilience of investments in Europe. The year 2001 
saw a decrease in activity of 39% compared to 62% in the US, which had experienced almost a 
double increase than Europe during the previous year. As a result, the wedge in invested funds 
between the two economies has narrowed for the first time since 1995. 
Another measure of investment activity is found in Figure 1, which compares the composition of 
investments by stage. US venture capitalists have increased over time their share of expansion 
investments while decreasing the share of funds invested in seed and start-up stages. The 
contemporaneous increase in the share of early stage investment in Europe has brought the stage 
structure of investment towards converging in the two economies. 
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Corporations Financial Government  Other 
1995  29%    5% 36% 3%  27% 
1996  34%    3% 35% 2%  26% 
1997 26%  11% 42% 2%  19% 
1998 24%  10% 37% 5%  24% 
1999 23%  10% 43% 5%  19% 
2000 31%  10% 32% 5%  22% 




Corporations Financial Government  Other 
1995  59%    5% 20% -  16% 
1996  70%  20%   3% -    7% 
1997  56%  25%   6% -  13% 
1998 66%  12% 10% -  12% 
1999  61%  14% 16% -    9% 
2000  61%    4% 23% -  12% 
2001  63%    3% 25% -    9% 
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations on EVCA and NVCA data. Institutional investors includes funds of funds, 
endowments & foundations and pension funds, corporations include investments by corporations (including 
corporate venture capital through dedicated funds), financial institutions includes banks, insurance companies, and 
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Europe remains however different in another important dimension, the amount of funds 
provided to portfolio companies. Table 3 shows that a larger number of companies are financed 
in Europe. Also, the fall in number of investments during 2001 was lower in Europe. The other 
side of the coin is that European companies receive, on average, less money than in the US, 
where the average investment remains about six times larger than in Europe.  
 
Table 3. Venture capital: number of financed companies and investment per 
company 










1995  n.a.  n.a. 1,568   4,701 
1996  n.a.  n.a. 2,098   5,673 
1997  3,967  1,358 2,583   6,219 
1998  5,083  1,502 3,456   6,209 
1999 7,335  1,721 4,480 12,151 
2000 9,574  2,038 6,366 16,637 
2001 7,350  1,631 3,798 10,695 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations on EVCA and NVCA data. Data for venture-backed companies are counts of exits; 
data for average investment are in current dollars. European companies includes EU countries and Norway, 
Switzerland, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Iceland and Slovakia. 
 
Looking at the number of venture capital firms in Europe and the United States is also 
instructive. Figure 2 plots the number of active venture capital firms reported by the US 
National Venture Capital Association and by the European Venture Capital Association. The 
wedge between the two economies has nearly halved during the period under consideration. It is 
important to notice that Europe’s run-up occurred mostly after 1998. The positive side to it is 
that a critical mass of venture capital firms is now operating on this side of the Atlantic. At the 
same time, more than doubling its ranks in just three years means that substantial learning by 
doing may be taking place, and that venture capital is still an infant industry in Europe. This is 
confirmed by the fact that in 2001 there were 55 new venture firms in Europe, as compared to 
only 18 in the US. We will get back to the implications of these facts. 
 
2.2  The creation of Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets 
We now turn to the other major change for European entrepreneurial companies, the creation of 
‘new’ markets for high-growth companies on the model of NASDAQ. These markets were 
created as new segments by most European Bourses, in an attempt to attract new listings from 
fast-growing companies in high-tech sectors. More than a dozen of these markets have opened   7
since Easdaq was created in 1996. Like venture capital, the ‘new’ markets have been highly 
praised by policy makers for constituting a positive ‘structural break’ able to create in Europe a 
virtuous circle involving venture capital, investors in risk capital, and entrepreneurs. 
One fact that stands out is their uneven performance in terms of attracting a critical mass 
of listed firms. Table 4 provides figures for 2001, which show that some of these markets have 
remained very small. Also, London’s TECHMark has mostly attracted companies already listed 
on the main segment of the stock exchange. The only three markets which performed 
consistently well in terms of new listings, market capitalization and turnover have been the 
Nouveau Marché (Paris), the Neuer Markt (Frankfurt), and the Nuovo Mercato (Milan). In the 
rest of the paper we therefore focus on them. 









 Athens   2001  1 n.a. 50 
 Amsterdam  1997  7 n.a. 268 
Copenhagen 2000  13 1,400 1,000 
 Dublin  1997  4 n.a. 34 
Frankfurt 1997  337 4,190 50,000 
Helsinki 1998  13 n.a. 437 
London 
(TECHMark) 
1999 246 35,000 690,000 
Madrid 2000  13 n.a. 17,000 
Milan 1999  45 1,790 13,000 
NASDAQ Europe 
(formerly Easdaq) 
1996 50 140 8,000 
Nordic  
New Market 
2000 55 190 301 
Paris 1996  164 670 15,000 
Stockholm 1998  22 n.a. 291 
Zurich 1999  15 1,200 4,000 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations from stock exchanges data. Financial data in millions of euros. Turnover is monthly 
average turnover during 2001, companies listed and market capitalization are values at the end of 2001. 
 
Table 5 documents the evolution of IPOs since their opening. Our data come from a unique 
hand-collected data set which we describe in section 3. It is clear that these markets have greatly 
suffered from the progressive deterioration of market conditions. The number of IPOs by non-
financial companies has dropped by more than 90% in 2001. Moreover, the number of de-
listings of companies which either go bankrupt or choose to move to the main stock market has   8
been increasing.  As a result the stock of listed companies is shrinking. It is natural for stock 
markets to experience windows of opportunities for new listings followed by relatively long 
periods of subsided issuing activity. In this sense the present shortage of listings does not 
necessarily constitute a concern
1.  These three markets have however contributed substantially 
to the financing of European entrepreneurial companies, since they have allowed them to raise 
capital for more than 30 billion euros. 
Table 5.  Number of IPOs on Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets 
  Listings De-listings  Stock 
1996   15 -  15
1997   31 -  46
1998   87 -  133
1999   174  1 306
2000   214  7 513
2001    19  26 506
Total 540 34  
Source: Authors’ calculations. Financial companies are excluded. Stock at end of the year. 
Moreover, these markets have also created a large exit opportunity for venture capitalist, which 
we document in Table 6. It is clear that a large number of companies is venture-backed. If we 
include financing from corporate venture capital firms and industrial companies investing 
through a corporate investment division, we find that more than half of the listed companies rely 
on venture financing. The role of corporate venturing in Europe should be stressed, since about a 
third of the venture-backed companies avail themselves of this type of financial and strategic 
support. The Table also shows that a large number of venture capital firms is linked to a listed 
company, on average more than one. 
 
Table 6. Venture-backed companies on Europe’s ‘new’ markets 
 
Venture-backed companies     303
Number of venture capital firms   424
Average number of venture capital 
firms per listed company 
1.39
Pre-IPO average holdings of 
venture capital firms 
19.9%
Post-IPO average holdings of 
venture capital firms 
11.5%
Notes: Venture capital firms include corporate venture capitalists. 
                                                           
1 More troubling is instead the fact that several companies choose to move to a different market segment.   9
 
Before turning to a rigorous analysis of the role that venture capital and the ‘new’ markets play 
in financing Europe’s entrepreneurial companies, it is worth noticing the importance that 
venture capital may have for the very creation of entrepreneurial firms. Bottazzi and Da Rin 
(2002a) document the increasing number of companies which list on a ‘new’ market and of 
companies which are born with venture capital financing. We find that this trend continues in 
2001 and 2002, since nearly 80% of the companies listing in this period are venture-backed. 
These trends suggest that in Europe venture capital may be very important for helping firms 
come into being. The financial support of venture capitalists as a means of overcoming credit 
constraints at the time of the creation of the firm is reported by 95% of the firms which have 
responded to a recent survey conducted by the European Venture Capital Association (2002a). 
Respondents to the survey also stress the importance of venture capital in ensuring continued 
financial support even at later stages of the firms’ life.  
It is therefore intriguing to ask what are the defining traits of European venture capital in 
terms of its role towards entrepreneurial firms. In the US venture capital has been shown to 
benefit start-ups beyond the supply of finance, with a ‘soft’ side that adds to the ‘hard’ financial 
side (Hellmann (2000)). In Europe, it is not clear which of these two sides is more important. 
Our analysis will try to shed some light on this issue.  
3.  Issues 
 In this section we turn to analyzing the facts we have uncovered. We ask some important 
questions: Has the creation of the ‘new’ markets in Europe managed to fund and select truly 
promising companies? Has the surge in the supply of venture capital corresponded to a growth 
in its ability to support the creation of innovative companies? 
The only way to obtain a convincing answer is to turn to firm-level data. Here we face serious 
obstacles. While in the US commercial companies have been gathering comprehensive and 
reliable data on venture financing since the 1970s, in Europe systematic data collection of this 
sort has yet to begin. In the lack of available sources, we develop a unique hand-collected data 
set that looks at the companies which listed on  the ‘new’ markets between 1997 and 2001 and 
at their sources of finance. Venture-backed companies constitute a substantial part of Europe's 
new public companies: we have seen that nearly 60% of these are backed by at least one venture 
capitalist.  
By looking only at listed companies we pay the price to ignore the behavior of those 
which remain private. We believe this to be a reasonable price to pay. The ability to bring 
companies public is important for venture capitalists, since IPOs are the most lucrative exit from   10
a venture investment, on average four to five times more profitable than acquisitions (Gompers 
and Lerner (1997)). Brau, Francis and Kohers (2002) find that companies which go public are 
valued more than those which are acquired.  In other words, these are arguably the most 
successful among entrepreneurial ventures.  It is then in venture capitalists’ interest to take 
portfolio companies public whenever possible. Moreover, reputational concerns should ensure 
that venture capitalists select the most promising firms to invest in. Therefore, by looking only 
at listed companies, we expect we might overestimate the impact of venture capital on corporate 
growth. 
Focussing on listed companies also has its advantages
2: these companies belong to a 
small number of high-tech industries, are of fairly similar age, and come from a small number of 
countries. They also provide a reliable control sample, allowing us to compare the performance 
of venture-backed and non venture-backed companies.  
3.1  Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets 
3.1.1  The Dataset 
We base our analysis on information from the listing prospectuses and annual reports of 538 
non-financial companies which listed on the Nouveau Marché, Neuer Markt, and Nuovo 
Mercato between March 1996 and December 2001
3.  Our sample contains 538 out of the 545 
IPO prospectuses of non-financial companies, and 1,183 post-IPO annual reports out of about 
1,300 through fiscal 2001. We also obtain 755 pre-IPO balance sheets from listing prospectuses. 
From each prospectus and annual report we code information on companies’ age, nationality, 
balance sheet data, choice of accounting standards, and ownership structure; from stock 
exchanges we collect information on issue prices and the amount of shares sold (see Bottazzi 
and Da Rin (2002a) for a detailed discussion). Sectoral attributions are derived from the 
Financial Times classification
4. Financing from a venture capital is identified by looking at the 
ownership structure at the time of listing. We consider venture capitalists all organizations that 
are members of the European Venture Capital Association or of a national venture capital 
association, and also include corporate venture capitalists and investment divisions of industrial 
companies. 
                                                           
2 Since listing process requires companies to disclose a large amount of detailed information, we also have the 
advantage of  being able to reconstruct their ownership, their capital structure, and their performance for up to three 
years before listing.  
3 We obtained these documents from the websites of the stock exchanges or from the companies. 
4 The six sectors are the following: biomedical (includes chemicals, diversified, health, pharmaceuticals, personal 
care), technology (includes construction, engineering, electrical products, electronics, house goods), media and 
entertainment (includes leisure and media), telecom, traditional (includes food, forestry, steel, distribution, 
transport) IT, software and internet (includes software, automotive services, retailers).   11
3.1.2  Listed companies: a snapshot at IPO 
We begin by exploring the structure of the companies listed on the ‘new’ markets. While mainly 
descriptive, this exercise provides valuable insights into what type of company goes public on 
these markets. Table 7 shows these companies to be small. The median values of assets and 
sales at IPO are 13.6 and 12.9 million euros, respectively, and employment equals 112.
5 The 
median age at IPO is just above 8 years.
6 Listing companies are heavily levered, with more debt 
than equity and a leverage ratio higher than what is typical of NASDAQ IPO firms. Their 
profitability, measured by return over assets, is fairly high; it is also very noisy, due to the 
relative ease with which earnings can be manipulated, a finding common to most studies on 
IPOs (see Degeorge and Zeckauser (1993)). 
We also report the growth rate of some variables in the two years before the IPO. These 
companies are growing fast in the wake of going public. The reported growth rates of sales, 
assets, and employees are between 27% and 40%, and represent a remarkable result. Also, we 
notice the high growth rate of debt. If one consider that the (unreported) growth rate of bank 
loans is close to zero, these figures suggest  that these companies may have come near to using 
up their borrowing capacity and face binding credit constraints.
7 
Since these markets were designed to appeal to innovative companies, we look at their 
investment in research and development (R&D). We construct a dummy variable that takes 
value one for companies which report in the prospectus the amount of R&D expenditure or of 
R&D workers, or which declare to be actively pursuing R&D programs, and we assume that 
firms which do not mention R&D in their prospectus do not perform it. According to this 
measure, two thirds of the companies engage in some form of R&D. A substantial involvement 
with research is confirmed by R&D intensity, defined as R&D expenditure divided by sales. At 
9%, R&D intensity is close to the typical value for high-tech companies in other countries, 
though it is reported by only a third of the companies. This might reflect the fact that some 




                                                           
5 Since we find high heterogeneity for most variables, reflected in their large standard deviation in (unreported) 
high values of skewness and kurtosis, we concentrate on median values, unless otherwise specified. 
6 Companies listing on the ‘main’ markets are usually much older: Rydqvist and Högholm (1995) report a median 
age of 26 years for companies listing in the 1980s and early 1990s. By contrast, companies listing in the US in the 
1980s and 1990sare much younger: six years according to Ritter (1991) and five years (for a sample of venture-
backed companies) according to Gompers (1996). 
7 The likelihood of this possibility is confirmed by the (unreported) growth rate of leverage in the year preceding 
the IPO, which is small and negative (-2%).   12
Table 7.  Listing companies at IPO 
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Observ. 
Variables 
Sales   44.9 12.9 173.0 536 
Assets 41.7 13.6 183.0 538 
Tangible assets  36.5 11.9 192.0 461 
Intangible assets  6.5 0.7 30.2 468 
Debt 18.9 6.7 40.4 538 
Equity 14.0 4.5 29.3 511 
Leverage 0.56 0.58 0.27 508 
Capital expenditure  -39.7 1.1 990.0 428 
Return on assets  (ROA)  -57% 9% 5,149% 536 
Age 128 100 132 534 
Employees 218 112 315 526 
Foreign sales share  39% 29% 32% 153 
R&D dummy  .67 1.00 .48 451 
R&D intensity  35% 9% 119% 189 
R&D labor share  28% 25% 18% 132 
Capital raised at IPO  5,280 51.8 13,100 528 
Free float  31.3% 29.3% 11.4% 528 
Variables growth rate 
Sales 17,719% 27% 355,789% 497 
Assets 1,612% 34% 21,412% 504 
Debt 546% 20% 6490% 501 
Employees 101% 40% 468% 444 
 
Notes: Financial data in millions of euros. Debt is the sum of book value of short- and long-term liabilities. Equity 
is total shareholders’ equity. Leverage is debt over debt plus equity. Capital expenditure equals investment in 
property, plant, and equipment. Return on assets is operating margin over assets, and operating margin equals 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Age is measured from the time of a company’s 
creation, not from its incorporation. Foreign sales share equals sales outside the company’s home country over total 
sales. R&D dummy takes value of for companies which report in the prospectus the amount of R&D expenditure or 
of R&D workers, or which declare to be actively pursuing R&D programs, and we assume that firms which do not 
mention R&D in their prospectus do not perform it. R&D intensity equals R&D expenditure over sales. R&D labor 
share is employees in R&D over total employment. Capital raised at IPO is the product of the issue price times the 
number of shares sold from the capital increase (including the actual greenshoe). Free float is the percentage of 
shares floated on the market.  
 
To obtain further measures of a company’s involvement with R&D, we look also at the 
share of employees working in R&D. Since scientists and engineers make up a large part of the 
research costs, and since their contracts are costly to terminate, this measure may disclose 
insightful information on listed companies’ long-term commitment to research. About a quarter 
of the companies report R&D labor figures, and this is fairly large: 25% of total employment.   13
Another important measure of the commitment to research is the investment in intangible assets, 
which include patents, software and goodwill. For innovative firms, in fact, intangible assets 
typically represent an important share of total assets. However, in our sample, intangible assets 
loom close to only about 5% of total assets. One possible explanation is that balance sheets 
accounting standards, adopted by the firms in our sample, do not allow for most of the 
intangible expenses to be capitalized. 
 Another dimension of innovation concerns commercialization, as we expect innovative, 
fast growing companies, to expand quickly beyond their domestic boundaries. We then compute 
the share of foreign sales reported in the listing prospectus. Slightly less than a third of the 
companies report this share, whose median value is a remarkable 29%.  
3 1.3   Listing companies: evolution after the IPO 
What role going public has on these companies’ ability to raise funds for investment? One way 
to answer this question is to measure the post-IPO performance of these firms. To do so we 
construct pre- and post-IPO measures of our variables
8. The results are reported in Table 8. The 
Table also reports the number of observations, which equals the number of firms for which we 
possess both pre- and post-IPO data. Reported values are medians. 
On these values we perform a Wilcoxon sign-rank test for the difference in medians. The bold 
type identifies values which differ at a level of statistical significance of at least 5%. It is 
remarkable that, except for R&D measures, all variables increase in both a statistical and 
economic significant sense. In less than two years sales more than double, reaching 28.3 million 
euros. Employment, which in Europe represents a long-term investment, more than triples, and 
capital expenditure increases twelve-fold. Listing also entails halving leverage, which reaches a 
level common among companies listed on European ‘traditional’ stock markets. Despite this, 
debt increases dramatically and becomes half the size of sales. This is an indication that these 
companies go public to raise capital and invest it in employees, assets, tangible and intangible 
assets. This behavior is consistent with the existence of pre-IPO credit constraints which get 
relaxed by the increased equity based. It also contrasts with the fact that companies listing on 
other markets typically use the IPO proceedings to repay the debt they incurred for financing 
pre-IPO investments (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998)). 
Companies which are active in R&D keep their quest for innovation high. The fact that 
R&D intensity and R&D labor share do not fall despite the surge in sales and employment is 
telling. Going public also helps these innovative firms reach wider markets. Firms which 
continue report foreign sales after the IPO see their share rise from 32% to 43%. Even more   14
impressive is the fact that these companies, which grew very fast before the IPO, increase their 
growth thereafter. The yearly growth rate of sales nearly doubles, and that of assets nearly 
triples. Both attain astounding levels. Debt increases not only its absolute value, but also its rate 
of growth, another indication of a possible relaxation of credit constraints.  
 Table 8.  Listing companies: post-IPO evolution 
  Pre-IPO Post-IPO Observ. 
Variables 
Sales   12.2 28.3 
Assets  11.9 50.9 390 
Intangible assets  0.2 6.0 263 
Debt  4.0 14.5 359 
Equity  1.9 34.3 324 
Leverage  0.74 0.31 319 
Capital expenditure  0.5 6.4 260 
Return on assets  (ROA)  8% 4% 353 
Employees  72 213 313 
Foreign sales share  32% 43% 63 
R&D intensity  12% 11% 96 
R&D labor share  27% 23% 26 
Variables growth rates 
Sales  44% 70% 369 
Assets  64% 167% 360 
Debt  49% 71% 356 
Employees  40% 60% 304 
Notes: Financial data in millions of euros. Debt is the sum of book value of short- and long-term liabilities. Equity 
is total shareholders’ equity. Leverage is debt over debt plus equity. Capital expenditure equals investment in 
property, plant, and equipment. Return on assets is operating margin over assets, and operating margin equals 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Foreign sales share equals sales outside the 
company’s home country over total sales. R&D intensity equals R&D expenditure over sales. R&D labor share is 
employees in R&D over total employment. 
 
The fact that profitability drops, being halved, is not uncommon among companies which go 
public (see Degeorge and Zeckauser (1993), Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah 
(1995)). We could view this as a sign that these companies suffer from opportunistic behavior 
on part of managers, who would engage in window dressing before the IPO or in wasteful 
investment after it. Another possible conjecture is that commercialization takes time, and that 
these young companies still have to reap the fruits of their new investments.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 These measures are the averages of the values of two pre-IPO and post-IPO years.  If only one value is available 
we use that one so as to make use of all available information.   15
We now turn to the core of our analysis. What is the role of listing and what is the role of 
venture capital in the financing of entrepreneurial, innovative companies? There are several 
issues which pertain to this question. First, do venture-backed companies behave differently 
from non venture-backed companies?  Does venture backing make any difference in terms of 
corporate growth? What role does venture capital play in Europe? A second type of questions 
concerns the role of the ‘new’ markets themselves. They have come under intense criticism for 
their dismal stock price performance, but have they succeeded in attracting and selecting 
companies with a true high-growth potential? We look at these two sets of issue in turn.     
3.2  The effects of venture capital on European entrepreneurial companies 
The question of the economic effect of venture capital is very important. However, in Europe it 
has not so far been addressed by academic studies, apart from the pioneering contribution of 
Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002a), whose statistical methodology is used in this section.  
Existing studies, by contrast, have largely been conducted for industry associations using 
methodologies which do not meet academic standards. These studies portrait venture capital as 
conducive to job creation and to the growth of technologically oriented firms. Venture-backed 
firms are found to grow faster, create more jobs, and export more than samples of established 
firms.
9 By comparing venture-backed firms with large firms, which are by their nature less 
dynamic (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)), these studies fail to use a proper control 
sample. A correct comparison should instead pit venture-backed against non-venture-backed 
start-ups. These studies, therefore, are unable to separate the effects of venture capital financing 
from those of being a (naturally fast-growing) start-up, and risk to capture effects due to a 
spurious correlation between being a start-up and receiving venture capital. In other words, it 
could very well be that the purported vitality of European venture-backed firms is due to factors 
other than venture capital. A deeper analysis is therefore warranted. 
3.2.1 Venture capital and corporate growth 
We first look into the issue of the contribution of venture capital to corporate growth. We take 
the IPO as a turning point in the life of these companies, because it provides them with the 
financial resources necessary to fully unfold their business potential. 
Academic studies on US venture capital have reached a consensus that venture-backed 
companies innovate faster and more fundamentally than other companies (Hellmann and Puri 
                                                           
9 For instance, between 1993 and 1997, British venture-backed companies increased employment by an yearly 24%, 
and sales by an yearly 40\%. By comparison, employment at the hundred largest British listed companies grew by 
7%, and sales by 15% (BVCA (1999)). On a European scale, between 1991 and 1995, employment at venture-
backed companies grew by an yearly 15\% and sales by an yearly 35%, as compared to 2% and 14% for the 500 
largest European listed firms (EVCA (1996)). NVCA (1998) claims that US venture-backed companies created jobs 
at a 55% faster pace than other start-ups between 1992 and 1996. NVCA (2002) reaches similar conclusions.   16
(2000) and Kortum and Lerner (2000)).  Moreover, venture capital has been shown to spur the 
professionalization of the firm and to connect it with potential clients and suppliers and to attract 
additional funding (Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Sapienza (1992)). These effects are likely to 
favor sales and employment growth. As shown for the US by Jain and Kini (1995). On the other 
hand, venture capitalists might be attracted by the innovativeness of a firms, which could be 
unrelated to employment or sales. At the extreme, venture capital could even be detrimental to 
growth if its main goal is to realize a 'quick and dirty' capital gain at IPO and then leave the 
company to its own fate. Our regressions evaluate these predictions. 
Our first piece of evidence comes from a systematic comparison of how venture-backed 
and non venture-backed companies behave around the IPO. The corresponding figures are 
shown in Table 9, which reports the results of two tests. A Wilcoxon test looks at the difference 
in median values pre- and post-IPO, using the two year averages constructed in Table 10. We 
run this test for both venture-backed and non venture-backed companies separately. A Kruskal-
Wallis sign-rank test looks instead at whether the median values of several variables differ in 
statistically significant manner between venture-backed and non venture-backed companies, 
within both the pre- and the post-IPO periods. Bold figures show those median values which 
differ significantly across time (within venture-backed and not venture-backed companies). 
Underlined figures show instead (within the pre- and post-IPO periods) those median values 
which are statistically significantly different between venture-backed and non venture-backed 
companies. 
The Table shows that before the IPO venture and non venture-backed companies do not 
differ systematically. We find statistically significant differences in profitability (venture-backed 
companies show a lower return on assets), sales and employment, which is lower for venture-
backed companies, and R&D intensity, which is instead higher. The capital structure is instead 
similar across the two groups. After the IPO, non venture-backed capital companies become 
significantly bigger in terms of sales (which we interpret as a sign of maturity), debt, and capital 
expenditure. We do not find a systematic difference between venture-backed and non venture-
backed companies in terms of employees, equity, and R&D intensity.    
Although the analysis of Table 9 is suggestive, it can not be considered conclusive. We 
need to control for other characteristics of the firms in order to ascertain the true impact of 
venture capital financing on corporate growth. 
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Notes: For each variable we report we report the median values for non venture-backed companies (no VC) in the 
upper row, and those for venture-backed companies (VC) in the lower row. Bold values indicate a statistically 
significant (at 5% confidence level) difference of medians across time. Underlined values indicate a statistically 
significant (at 5% confidence level) difference between venture-backed and non venture-backed companies. 
 
We thus turn to a more formal analysis, where we look at the effect of venture backing on the 
growth of employment and sales after the IPO. Sales represent the main measure of corporate 
maturity for innovative companies, since the ability to bring products to markets and sell them is 
a crucial step to ensure their very survival (Audretsch (1995)). Employment is also important, as 
it represents the main long-term investment of a firm in an environment where labor markets are 
still quite rigid. 
(a) Employment  
We have in mind a very simple model of corporate growth (see Hart (2000)): the ability of a 
firm to grow is a positive function of its ability to invest, which can be financed either from 
revenues or from external finance. Age, an indicator of the stage of corporate development, is 
also relevant since we expect younger companies to grow faster. We use these variables in the 
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regression reported in Table 10.
10 Given the variability in our data, in all our regressions we 
adopt an estimation method which eliminates gross outliers and employs robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable is the average growth rate of employment in the two years after the IPO. 
Note that the dimension of our data set decreases both because not all companies report 
employment data and because we cannot compute post-IPO employment growth for companies 
which went public in 2001. We are then left with 357 observations. 
The results confirm our intuition. Relatively younger companies and those whose 
leverage is lower, increase their employment more. Leverage, in particular, is not only 
statistically but also economically significant: A 10% increase in leverage means a company 
decreases its growth rate of  0.41% in the post-IPO period. Companies listed on the Neuer Markt 
experience an employment growth rate which is 28% higher than the others.  
 
Table 10.  Robust regression—dependent variable employment growth rate 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
Venture capital   -.0021
    -.03 
Leverage (at IPO)       -.0408
***  -2.76 
Dummy 1998    -.0008
*  -1.88 
Dummy 1999   -.0005  -1.49 
Dummy 2000      -.0001
**  -2.20 
Capital raised at IPO    .0002  0.92 
Founders        .2331
***  3.37 
Management    .0546  0.52 
Neuer Markt        .2867
***   4.01 
Constant   .1612   1.08 
Number of obs.  357   
F (14, 342 )  3.59   
P-value 0.0000   




*** (1%). Huber-White corrected standard errors are used to obtain robust estimates. 
 
We also control for several measures of ownership structure. A large theoretical literature 
predicts that ownership structure should influence corporate performance, in particular for 
young, entrepreneurial firms (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Ownership structure has in fact 
been found to be an important determinant of post-IPO corporate performance of US firms by 
                                                           
10  In an unreported regression we control for a dummy which takes value one when a company declares in the IPO 
prospectus its willingness to expand the market for its products outside of the domestic domain and zero otherwise. 
We believe the willingness to export to be a characteristic of more dynamic companies, since expanding beyond 
one's natural realm requires the ability to sell truly innovative products and services. However this variable does not 
turn out to be significant.   19
Barry et. al. (1990) and Mikkelson et. (1997). On the basis of the firms level data we have 
gathered  we construct a number of dummy variables. Founders takes value one if the 
company’s founders retain a holding greater than 50% after the IPO, managers takes value one 
if the managers retain a holding of more than 20%, venture capital takes value one if these 
investors retain a holding of more than 10%. These thresholds are the mean post-IPO values of 
the respective categories, except for founders. The Table shows that venture capital plays no 
role, as it implies a decrease in the employment growth rate, which is however statistically 
insignificant. Companies grow faster instead when their founders retain majority ownership 
after the IPO. This confirms and refines the findings of Jain and Kini (1994), who employ a 
coarser measure of ownership, i.e. the median stake retained collectively by all pre-IPO owners, 
and find a positive effect on measures of operating performance. Sectors of activity and year 
dummies are not found to be statistically significant.  
We then control for R&D expenditure, as reported in Table 10(A) in the Appendix. To 
avoid an issue of simultaneity and of reverse causality we control for firms declaring R&D at 
IPO. This variable turns out to be statistically significant: R&D performing firms have a 12% 
lower growth rate of employment. Leverage and the Neuer Markt dummy remain significant and 
retain (even increase) their size, while the amount of capital raised at IPO remains statistically 
insignificant. Again, venture capital does not seems to be relevant and maintain his negative 
effect on job creation. The positive effect of founders is preserved. 
  (b) Sales  
We then turn to the post-IPO sales growth rate. Table 11 reports our estimates. Our dependent 
variable is now the average growth rate of sales in the two years after the IPO. The results do 
not differ much from those for employment growth. Older and more  leveraged companies 
experience a lower sales growth rate: A 10% increase in leverage  results in almost 1% lower 
post-IPO sales growth rate. Companies listed on the Neuer Markt have almost  42% higher sales 
growth rate. Venture capital financing remains ineffective: Venture-backed companies sell 
almost 12% more than the others, but the result is not statistically significant. Like in the case of 
employment, ownership matters. We find that firms whose founders retain a holding greater 
than 50% and whose managers retain more than 20% after the IPO have a 23% and 27%  higher 
sales growth rate, respectively.  Year dummies and sectors of activity continue to hold no effect 
apart from companies in the biomed sector that experience a slightly lower sales growth rate. 
The results are unchanged when we control for lagged sales growth rate and for firms’ pre IPO 
profitability. Controlling for R&D activity undertaken at IPO, we reduce the sample to 310 
companies. Table 11(A) in the Appendix shows that R&D performing companies have a 14%   20
lower sales growth than the others; however the result is not statistically significant. Age and  
leverage retain their negative effect on sales, while the controls for the Neuer Markt and for the 
amount of funds raised at IPO remain positive. 
Table 11.  Robust regression—dependent variable sales growth rate 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
Venture capital   .1269      .93 
Leverage (at IPO)      -.1012
***   -3.74 
Age     -.0011
**   -2.52 
Capital raised at IPO       .0018
***    3.98 
Dummy 1999  .1562    1.10 
Dummy 2000  .1127     0.71 
Founders  .2375    1.90 
Management  .2749    1.44 
Neuer Markt       .4179
***     3.16 
Constant    .7125
**     2.47 
Number of obs.  385   
F (14, 370)  5.01   
P-value 0.0000   




*** (1%). Huber-White corrected standard errors are used to obtain robust estimates. 
 
3.2.2 Venture capital and capital raised at IPO 
We now analyze whether venture capital affects the amount of capital raised at IPO, which 
provides the resources necessary for realizing a company’s growth potential. We know that an 
important role of venture capital is the provision of financing. Does this also imply that venture-
backed companies are able to raise more money from the public markets? As in the case of 
corporate growth, there could be opposing effects of venture capital financing. On the one hand, 
'certification' from a venture capitalist may reassure investors even when accounting results do 
not still reflect the full potential of the company. In this case the presence of venture capital 
would be associated with higher amounts raised. The same would hold true if it were the case 
that venture capitalists are patient enough to wait for a 'hot' IPO market, as found for the US by 
Lerner (1994). On the other hand, if venture capital 'pushed' firms to the market, its eagerness to 
exit quickly could be detrimental for the amount of funds raised, both because investors would 
be suspicious of venture-backed companies and because the IPO might happen during a 'cold' 
market.  
Table 12 reports the results from our regression. The dependent variable is the amount of 
funds raised at IPO. Given the high variation in firm size, which arguably influences how much   21
capital a company can raise, we normalize it by dividing it by assets at IPO. Notice that we use 
assets and not sales. The reason is that sales would be a poor measure of the size of these young, 
innovative companies, which still need time to unfold their growth potential. In fact, we view 
sales as a good measure of the extent to which an innovative company has matured. Therefore 
we use sales (divided by assets) as a regressor, along with controls for the ownership structure, 
leverage, and age, all measured at the time of the IPO. As in the previous regressions we control 
for country and sectoral effects, and we add time dummies. 
Companies with higher sales (over assets, both measured at IPO), and therefore probably 
more mature, are able to raise a higher amount at IPO: An increase of 10% of sales (over assets) 
brings an additional 1% increase in the amount raised. Since the latter is normalized by assets, 
this is an economically sizeable effect. Ownership structure becomes important, with venture 
capital having a positive and significant effect. 
 
Table 12. Robust regression—dependent variable amount of funds raised at IPO 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
Venture capital    .338*    1.80 
Telecom 1999      2.663
***    3.02 
France -.4499**  -2.22 
Sales/Assets        .1132
***     5.07 
Dummy 1999        .6542
***    2.29 
Dummy 2000      1.1108
***    3.95 
US-GAAP        .3783
***    1.99 
Founders  -.1132    -.65 
Management   -.0675   -0.26 
Leverage (at IPO)    .0110      .25 
Age -.0017***  -2.81 
Constant        1.2703
***    2.62 
Number of obs.  508   
F (17, 492)  7.72   
P-value 0.0000   




*** (1%). Huber-White corrected standard errors are used to obtain robust estimates. 
 
We introduce two additional controls. The first takes care of the high valuations that 
stock markets have experienced in the period under consideration. To this purpose, year 
dummies control for the year of listing. Firms which listed in 1999 and (especially) in 2000 turn 
out to have received significantly higher valuations. Another dummy controls for the high 
valuations that telecom companies experienced in 1999; this effect is positive an highly   22
statistically significant, as expected.  The second control takes care for the choice of US style 
accounting standards. The dummy US-GAAP takes value one for all firms adopting US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in their issuing prospectus. This choice is motivated 
by the ongoing policy debate over the effectiveness of accounting standards. US-GAAP are 
widely accepted internationally and are therefore a way to increase the pool of potential 
investors. Both US-GAAP and IAS are frequently viewed as the benchmark for high quality 
global standards, though their relative merits are controversial (see Ashbaugh (2001) and Levitt 
(1998)). By controlling for the adoption of US-GAAP we thus investigate whether firms exhibit 
measurable differences in proxies for information asymmetry and market liquidity, two 
constructs that are of primary concern in securities and accounting regulation (Leuz (2002), 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)).  We find the choice of accounting standards to be a primary 
determinant of the ability to raise capital at IPO. Firms adopting US-GAAP raise an amount of 
funds (normalized by assets) which is more than 50% higher than other firms. 
When we control for R&D intensity our results change (see Table 12(A) in the 
Appendix), sales (over assets) remains significant and do not lose much of their economic 
impact, and the positive effect of US-GAAP remains. The presence of a venture capitalist 
becomes instead irrelevant for explaining the amount raised at IPO.  
3.2.3  Robustness checks 
Our last step consists of tackling some limitations of our analysis. Our results could indeed 
suffer from two possible selection biases, on both observable and unobservable variables. In the 
previous sections we have tried to evaluate the impact of venture capital financing on the 
companies listed on the ‘new’ markets. The 'evaluation problem', as it is known in the 
econometric literature, is the problem of correctly measuring the effect of a ‘cure,’ such as a 
policy reform or a training program, on some variables (see Blundell and Costas Dias (2000)).  
The problem in evaluating a cure is that both observable and unobservable variables may 
be present, which might bias the estimates if not properly accounted for. In the impossibility of 
obtaining experimental data, different methods of evaluation have been adopted by researchers. 
We thus re-evaluate the effect of venture capital assessing whether our previous estimates are 
subject to these biases. We consider two different methodologies, the ‘matching’ method and the 
difference in differences method.  
(a) The ‘matching’ method 
  A problem with our analysis so far is that being backed by venture capital is not random. 
As a consequence, receiving venture capital might depend on (observable) variables that also 
affect our dependent variables, such as sales or employment growth. If that effect turned out to   23
be important, our previous estimates might be biased and our conclusions flawed. The matching 
method allows us to estimate the effects of venture capital correcting for the possible effect of 
observable variables. The method helps reduce the bias, but possibly at the cost of losing 
efficiency. In other words we could obtain estimates with a lower statistical significance. Table 
13 reports the estimates obtained with this method for our three variables. We call the average 
effect of venture capital on venture-backed companies τ. The estimated values of  τ provide 
measures of the effect of venture capital on the amount raised at IPO similar to those we 
obtained in the previous section: the matching method suggests a positive average effect of 
venture capital on the amount raised at IPO, which was found in our earlier regression. 
However, this method does not confirm our finding of a negative effect of venture financing on 
the post-IPO growth of employment while it confirm the positive effect on post IPO sales. As 
expected, the standard errors of amount raised, employment and sales growth become 
considerably large. 
Table 13.  Nonparametric stratification estimates: Average effect of venture capital 
  τ  t-ratio 
Amount raised (over assets)    4.56    .37 
Employment growth rate      .23  1.57 
Sales growth rate  16.40    .66 
 
(b) The ‘difference in differences’ method 
The second approach is known as the difference in differences (DID) method, and helps 
addressing possible evaluation biases due to the effects of unobservable variables which could 
be driving the difference in behavior of the two groups we are trying to compare, venture-
backed and non venture-backed companies. The DID estimator compares the difference in the 
average behavior before and after the IPO for the eligible group (venture-backed companies) 
with the behavior before and after the IPO of the control group (non venture-backed companies). 
Notice that we compare the behavior around the IPO since we need to pin down the effect of 
venture capital (the ‘cure’) on how treated and untreated companies react to a common external 
shock (the IPO). Therefore we can apply the DID estimator only in the case of employment and 
sales growth, since amount raised only occur at IPO. We indicate the estimator with θ, which 
measures the growth of venture-backed in excess to that of non venture-backed companies. 
  Table 14 shows the results of the DID estimator for the post-IPO growth in employment 
and sales for the two groups of companies. Our estimates for the sales growth  rate confirm the 
sign of our previous estimate and that of the matching estimator. In the case of the effect of VC   24
on the employment growth rate we instead find a positive coefficient, albeit not statistically 
significant. 
Table 14. Difference in differences estimates: Average effect of venture capital 
  θ  t-statistics 
Employment growth rate  0.34  0.65 
Sales growth rate  0.23  1.40 
 
Overall, we conclude that the inference from our regression analysis may not be robust to 
possible specification biases with respect to observable variables in the case of employment 
growth rate. In the case of the amount of funds raised at IPO, instead, we find reasons to remain 
confident on the robustness of our findings. 
4.  Research Agenda 
We have documented profound changes in European entrepreneurial firms’ ability to raise 
external finance from venture capital investors and from the stock markets. Our results suggest a 
rich research agenda for both empirical and theoretical economists. In this section we look at 
several themes which await further investigation and we relate them to our results and to some 
interesting recent contributions from financial economics and public policy studies.  More 
specifically, we now consider five promising area of research. 
4.1  Does venture capital operate differently across economies? 
Our results suggest that venture capital is likely to behave differently on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. However, models of venture capital has so far relied on US stylized facts (see Gompers 
and Lerner (1999)). Most existing models of venture capital (surveyed by Tykvová (2000)), 
therefore explain optimal contracting choices in a US-style environment. Since we still know 
very little about how venture capitalists behave in other countries, only few theoretical models 
have been offered in alternative to the US paradigm. This is a promising area of research, given 
that some recent contributions have started unveiling evidence on how venture firms operate in 
Europe and in Japan, suggesting not only that differences exist, but also that they may be 
important.  
Mayer, Schoors and Yafeh (2002), for instance, document the relationship between 
venture capitalists’ sources of finance and investors behavior. They show that different sources 
of finance are correlated with different investing attitudes, so that independent venture 
partnership invest in earlier stage than bank-owned venture firms. At the same time, there exist 
distinct country effects, so that bank-financed venture firms operate differently in different   25
countries. This generates a variety of investment patterns which are not explained by extant 
models, and which represent a promising research area. 
Coming to the other end of the venture capital cycle, Schwienbacher (2002) uses results 
from a survey of American and European venture capitalists to argue that exit behavior is 
significantly different in the two economies. For instance, syndication is significantly more 
common in the US, where the duration of venture investments is shorter. Interestingly, exit 
strategies seem to differ more (across the two economies) for older venture firms, while venture 
firms founded after 1997 tend to converge towards similar behavior.  
Another dimension which appears to differ widely across countries is contracting, as 
reported by Cummings (2002) and by Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg (2002). These (still 
preliminary) studies find that contracting in Europe differs from the US paradigm documented 
by Kaplan and Strömberg (2002). While this difference may in itself be not very surprising, 
given the role of regulations in shaping contracts, it raises an important question: whether 
different contractual forms respond only to legal constraints or represent also different economic 
solutions to the underlying governance problem of financing and supporting entrepreneurial 
start-ups.  
The most pressing question we face is what effectively venture capital does in Europe. 
Gathering systematic evidence on the behavior of venture capital firms in European countries 
should therefore be the highest priority for empirical researchers. We need a much deeper 
knowledge of the funding and investment behavior of venture investors with detailed micro-
level data. While these are proving difficult to collect through surveys, a detailed data-gathering 
effort on part of the European Venture Capital Association might be an alternative.  
4.2   What role does venture capital play in Europe? 
Even abstracting from diversity of behavior across European countries, there are some important 
differences with the US which we should understand better. Some recent theoretical studies 
provide reasons why the nature of the investors may matter. In particular, they suggest that 
‘captive’ venture capital firms (e.g. bank subsidiaries or corporate venture funds) may have 
different objectives than independent partnerships funded by institutional investors. They 
provide grounds for pushing ahead the search for evidence on differences in investment 
behaviors of different sorts of venture firms. 
Hellmann (2002), for instance, argues that corporate venture capital has different goals 
than ‘financial’ venture capital, since it internalizes the externality which a new venture creates 
for its ongoing business. We should therefore find corporate investors to be supporting projects 
complementary to their existing business and eschew potential substitutes. More fundamental   26
innovations are then likely to look for independent investors, which do not fear ‘product 
cannibalization.’ In the European context, this is an interesting hypothesis to explore, especially 
since we have seen that corporate venture capital backs a large number of innovative companies. 
A possibility is that in Europe, where markets are more fragmented and less contestable than in 
the US, support from an established firm may help support sales.  
The other dominant investor in European venture capital are banks. Landier (2001) suggests that 
bank financing and bank-controlled venture firms may be prevalent in Europe because of the 
high stigma associated with bankruptcy, measured in terms of cost of credit for failed 
entrepreneurs. He argues that a high (low) stigma for failed entrepreneurs—typical of Europe 
(the US)—is associated with few (many) start-ups and the adoption of less risky (riskier) 
projects. Debt-like (equity-like) contracts, common in Europe (the US), provide the optimal 
contract in this situation. 
Both of the above arguments revolve around the existence of different institutional 
environments as an explanation of the different roles and forms that venture financing may take. 
Further exploring this line of thought is likely to bring new advances. Venture capital is in fact 
highly dependent on human capital, since decisions are taken on the basis of personal 
assessments of business prospects, and a large literature documents the importance of human 
capital in venture capital (see Hellmann (2000)). People therefore matter, and we should better 
understand whether different venture organization attract venture capitalists with different 
backgrounds and skills, and if so the extent to which investment decisions are driven by 
institutional form as opposed to human capital. A related dimension concerns the extent to 
which US style investment practices have been transferred to European venture firms through 
the hiring of US trained venture capitalists. This would help assess whether Europe differs from 
the US because its venture industry is still infant rather than because of a different institutional 
environment. 
Once investment decisions are made, they will bring fruit in the form of successful 
companies. The consensus from studies based on US data is that venture capital does provide 
companies with screening, monitoring, and mentoring services which are reflected in faster 
professionalization (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), stronger innovation (Kortum and Lerner 
(2000)), and higher growth rates (Jain and Kini (1995)).  
Very little is know for Europe in this respect. However, we have shown above that European 
venture-backed IPO firms do not grow faster than others. This leaves us with a fundamental 
question: what is the contribution of venture capital to the financing of European entrepreneurial   27
firms? The question is still open, but if the existing evidence will be confirmed by more studies, 
we should look for roles other than growth-support.  
A likely candidate is the provision of funds at early stages, so as to allow new ventures 
to overcome financing constraints
11. The study of the European Venture Capital Association 
(2002a) we mentioned above argues that entrepreneurial companies look at venture capital as a 
primary source of financial survival, precisely because they cannot find alternative sources of 
credit.  Micro-econometric studies of the effects of venture capital on the capital structure and 
borrowing capacity of portfolio firms could put these claims on firmer grounds. 
4.3  What barriers to entrepreneurship in Europe? 
The very existence of entrepreneurial projects is obviously a pre-requisite for the formation of 
new companies, their growth and expansion. One concern of policy makers has recently been 
the perceived lack of entrepreneurial initiatives in European countries (see for instance OECD 
(1998)). It is often argued that labor and financial market rigidities discourage entrepreneurial 
activities, and that bankruptcy rules and social stigma excessively penalize failed ventures.  
What does this mean for the financing of entrepreneurship? Some novel models look at 
the effect of institutional constraints on the link between the choice to start a venture and its 
financing. Landier (2001) argues that bankruptcy more forgiving to entrepreneurs may indirectly 
spur venture capital, and in turn entrepreneurial activity. In  a related paper, Gromb and 
Scharfstein (2002) focus on labor market rigidities as a barrier to entrepreneurship. They 
maintain that when failing means a lower wage for the entrepreneurs, financing project with a 
firm (‘intrapreneurship’) becomes more attractive than venture capital, thus thwarting the 
creation of new ventures. Labor market structure thus determines the prevalence of different 
forms of financing start-ups. Hellmann (2002) provides another explanation of intrapreneurship, 
which highlights the importance of intellectual property rights over employee-generated 
inventions. Ueda (2002) shows that a poor protection of intellectual property rights may hamper 
the growth of the venture capital industry.  
The magnitude of such indirect effects across different markets and institutions have yet 
to be tested against hard evidence, and work based on data from countries with different 
structures could provide very useful new insights. There is a large gain to be made by a rigorous 
empirical exploration based on these theories, and a chance to substantially increase our 
understanding of the working of venture financing in Europe. The institutional and regulatory 
diversity of European countries is in this case a blessing to researchers. 
                                                           
11 Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002b), for instance, look at the capital structure of companies listing on Europe’s ‘new’ 
stock markets. These companies are hihgly leveraged at the IPO, and show signs to have used up bank credit. In 
fact, the proceedings of the IPO are used to rebalance the capital structure but also to substantially increase debt.   28
4.4  Is there a role for stock markets targeted at entrepreneurial companies? 
Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets have come under heavy criticism for their supposed inability to 
provide investors with attractive returns. The dismal stock price performance of these markets 
seems to support this view, as well as the fact that several of the best performing companies are 
moving to the ‘main’ markets to get rid of the bad reputation the ‘new’ markets now have.  
Also in this case sound economic analysis can help get useful insights. We have seen that 
companies listing on Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets undergo a dramatic change in their capital 
structure, invest the large proceedings of the IPO to expand investment in physical and 
intangible assets, and soon experience increased growth rates of employment and sales. 
Moreover In this respect, the ‘new’ markets deserve a better reputation. What is also true, on the 
other hand, is that there is substantial heterogeneity in performance, so that extremely successful 
firms coexist with lame ducks. An open question is why has this happened. We have seen that a 
possible candidate is the quality of disclosure standards, and the willingness to impose high 
disclosure to listing firms. While much theoretical work has been done recently on the 
competition among exchanges in terms of listing rules, there is an obvious need to evaluate how 
existing rules perform in terms of selecting valuable companies. 
Another important question which remains open is the extent to which venture capital 
and stock market help each other. The view prevailing among practitioners is that exit by IPOs 
is a necessary condition for venture capital to thrive. Michelacci and Suarez (2002) formalize 
this view, which receives some preliminary support from Jeng and Wells (2000). In the 
European context, the opening of the ‘new’ stock markets represents an interesting experiment 
in this respect. The fact that their opening coincided with the surge in venture capital fund 
raising and investment creates a challenging research task, namely to disentangle the effective 
link between stock markets and venture capital from a variety of policy and institutional changes 
which took place during that period. Learning whether these two sources of finance for 
entrepreneurial firms really complement each other can offer new insights to policy makers.  
4.5   What role for public policy? 
We have noticed that for European policy makers the promotion of entrepreneurship is a high 
priority. The Lisbon Council in 2000, for instance, put fostering technological innovation and 
entrepreneurship as crucial means towards the accomplishment of a more competitive Europe. 
Public policy can take on different dimensions and measures. Here we look at some which 
appear particularly important. In particular, we wish to stress the importance of considering 
explicitly the effects that public policy has on the complex set of incentives and trade-offs which 
underlies the financing of entrepreneurial start-ups.    29
Taxation and subsidies are the most traditional means of public intervention in any 
market. This applies also to the financing of entrepreneurial companies. New ventures give rise 
to many taxation possibilities, ranging from capital gains to wages and profits. The European 
Venture Capital Association (2002b) strongly argues for a favorable taxation of venture 
investing, given the positive effects it has on economic growth. These claims receive support 
from recent US evidence (Cullen and Gordon (2002)), though very little evidence is available 
for Europe, which makes it hard to evaluate the merits of any reform proposal. Empirical 
research in this direction is urgently needed.  
Also the theoretical understanding of the effects of taxation on venture creation leaves 
space for new contributions. Taxation of capital gains, profits or wages has so far been 
considered from the point of view of the incentives for investors and entrepreneurs to confer 
money and time to the creation of a new venture. This traditional approach has focused on 
capital contributions and capital gains in isolation. However, we have seen that a distinct feature 
of venture capital is the provision of mentoring and advice. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) 
explore the interplay between different forms of taxation, the provision of mentoring services, 
and entrepreneurs’ decision to set-up a venture. They suggest that a broader policy scope can 
have important advantages, since it takes into account the effect of taxation on the incentives to 
mentoring and how these affect, in turn, entrepreneurs’ trade-off between setting up a venture 
and remaining in a salaried job.  
Another interesting approach considers explicitly how taxation affects indirectly the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and financiers (Gilson and Schizer (2002)). The point here is 
that taxation may be an important determinant of the preference for convertible securities in US 
style venture financing. Since the use of different securities affects the incentives of agents, and 
therefore the type of contracts which emerge in the market, we are reminded that taxation may 
have far-reaching (and maybe unintended) consequences. 
Subsidies to venture financing, in the form of outright investment by public funds, by tax 
breaks for investors and companies, or by co-investment in private venture funds have been used 
in several countries. A rigorous evaluation of the effects of these support programs is still to be 
carried out. There are several possible channels through which public programs could benefit 
entrepreneurial firms. Lerner (1998), for instance, shows that the Small Business Innovation 
Research Program in the US resulted in significantly higher growth of awardees and may have 
contributed to the growth and maturation of the US venture capital industry. The presence of 
different venture capital public support programs in Europe offers a good opportunity to 
evaluate econometrically the effectiveness of different approaches. This appears a particularly   30
urgent task, given the large efforts to spur the growth of the venture capital industry. Probably 
the most relevant issue here is whether public support would best be targeted at increasing the 
flow of funds into venture capital or at helping the maturation and professionalization of the 
industry. That the latter goal may be relevant is argued by Becker and Hellmann (2000) and by 
Freeman (1998). Our evidence about the fast recent evolution of venture capital organizations 
would suggest that they may be right. 
The arguments about institutional constraints as a major reason behind Europe’s 
different type of venture capital suggest that public policy may be very powerful when targeting 
financial, labor, or product market structure. On the other hand, the more traditional tax and 
subsidy policies also seem to yield important effects on venture investing. Here economists can 
play two potentially useful roles. First, they can further elucidate the theoretical links between 
institutional constraints and identify practicable policy measures. Second, they can assess the 
effective magnitude of the effects of alternative policies, thus helping policy makers take 
informed decisions. For example, Bottazzi, Da Rin and Giavazzi (2001) argue that lower R&D 
productivity is behind Europe’s dismal total factor productivity performance, and conjecture that 
the former may be due to a short supply of high-quality entrepreneurial project. Obtaining 
convincing evidence of this link and of its extent could support effective policy measures. 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we document some new facts on the financing of European entrepreneurial 
companies. We show how during the latter part of the 1990s venture capital and public markets 
have contributed to their financing to an unprecedented extent. Based on a unique, hand-
collected database, we have shown that a sizeable number of fast-growing companies have 
received venture backing. However, we have also shown that venture-backed companies do not 
seem to grow systematically faster than other listed companies.  
These results, while not yet conclusive on the role of venture capital in Europe, suggest 
that venture capital is deeply different this side of the Atlantic. This poses exciting challenges in 
terms of discovering the whole picture and providing an explanation for the differences with 
US-style venture capital. A conjecture which emerges from our data is that European venture 
capital is providing more money than advice, and that its main contribution lies in the ability to 
help companies come into being. Further work, for which we trace a road-map, could shed more 
light on the role of venture capital in Europe and on its effects on the creation of entrepreneurial 
innovative companies. Beyond intellectual curiosity, the progress of empirical and theoretical 
understanding could provide policy makers with valuable suggestions. In fact, it is particularly 
important that national and EU-wide policies be well informed, lest they simply adopt for the   31
EU prescriptions which may be valid in the US context but which here could prove 
counterproductive. We hope our study will contribute to spur policy-relevant research efforts.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 10(A).  Robust regression – dependent variable employment growth rate 
(controlling for R&D) 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
Venture capital    -.0187    -.21 
Leverage (at IPO)        -.0423
***  -2.79 
Dummy 1998    -.0009
*  -1.90 
Dummy 1999    -.0005
  -1.59 
Dummy 2000      -.0010
**  -2.15 
Dummy R&D   -.1187
  -1.48 
Capital raised at IPO    .0002      .70 
Founders    .2017    2.54 
Management    .0888      .73 
Neuer Markt        .3091
***    3.71 
Constant     .4629
**    2.37 
Number of obs.  289   
F (15, 273)  2.86   
P-value 0.0003   




*** (1%). Huber-White corrected standard errors are used to obtain robust estimates. 
 
Table 11(A).  Robust regression – dependent variable sales growth  
(controlling for R&D) 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
Venture capital    .1721    1.05 
Leverage (at IPO)       -.1035
***   -3.55 
Age       -.0013
***   -2.66 
Dummy R&D  -.1475       -.97 
Capital raised at IPO       .0017
***   3.50 
Dummy 1999  .2586   1.49 
Dummy 2000  .1569   0.82 
Founders .1633    1.08 
Management .3601    1.50 
Neuer Markt     .3859
**   2.42 
Constant     .8288
**    2.21 
Number of obs.  310   
F (15, 294)  4.02   
P-value 0.0000   




*** (1%). Huber-White corrected standard errors are used to obtain robust estimates.   34
 
Table 12(A). Robust regression – dependent variable amount of funds raised at IPO 
(controlling for R&D) 
 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t-statistics 
Venture capital  .129     .56 
Telecom 1999     2.714
***   2.76 
Sales/Assets       .0863
***   3.18 
Dummy 1998   -.733
*  -1.59 
Dummy 1999   .0137     .03 
Dummy 2000   .6257     1.47 
US-GAAP  .4968    2.18 
Founders -.2140    -1.04 
Management -.259    -0.395 
Leverage (at IPO)   .0233    0.49 
Age      -.0020
***   -2.76 
Dummy R&D      .4254
*    2.01 
Nouveau Marché  -.1779  -0.73 
Constant      1.5801
***    2.44 
Number of obs.  423   
F (16, 406)  4.96   
P-value 0.0000   
 




*** (1%). Huber-White corrected standard errors are used to obtain robust estimates. 
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